Bayesian Methods for Evidence Evaluation: Are We There Yet?

Running title: Goodman; Bayesian methods for resolving controversy

Steven N. Goodman, MD, MHS, PhD

Stanford University, Stanford, CA

Address for Correspondence:
Steven N. Goodman, MD, MHS, PhD
Stanford University School of Medicine
Medicine, and Health Research and Policy
259 Campus Dr., HRP/Redwood Building T265
Stanford, CA 94305-1026
Tel: 650-723-8524
Fax: 650-723-8524
E-mail: steve.goodman@stanford.edu

Journal Subject Code: [Treatment:[23] Catheter-based coronary and valvular interventions:other

Key words: biostatistics, guideline, methodology, Editorial
“First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win,” a saying reportedly misattributed to Mahatma Ghandi\(^1\), might apply to the use of Bayesian statistics in medical research. The idea that Bayesian approaches might be used to “affirm” findings derived from conventional methods, and thereby be regarded as more authoritative, is a dramatic turnabout from an era not very long ago when those embracing Bayesian ideas were considered barbarians at the gate. I remember my own initiation into the Bayesian fold, reading with a mixture of astonishment and subversive pleasure one of George Diamond’s early pieces taking aim at conventional interpretations of large cardiovascular trials of the early 80’s.\(^2\) It is gratifying to see that the Bayesian approach, which saw negligible application in biomedical research in the 80’s and began to get traction in the 90’s, is now not just a respectable alternative to standard methods, but sometimes might be regarded as preferable.

That said, it is premature to declare a “win,” and the statistical lingua franca of biomedical research is still firmly frequentist, with P-values, confidence intervals and Type I and II errors dominating the journal landscape. It is helpful to use the thoughtful and thorough Bayesian exercise of Bittl et al.\(^3\) to reflect on what Bayesian approaches give us, and what they don't.

Many introductions to this approach can be found in the literature, and those basics will not be repeated here\(^2-^4\). But it is useful to examine the philosophic foundations of Bayesianism, which have their roots not so much in Bayes theorem, from which the approach gets its name, but in its definition of probability, which Bittl et al. allude to. Uncertainty can be roughly divided into two types; stochastic and epistemic\(^7,^8\). Stochastic probability concerns repeatable random processes and numbers like the chance of flipping five successive heads. These probabilities have an objective reality (or we imagine they do), can be calculated with equations and typically
can be confirmed in simulations or empirical experiments. Epistemic probability, on the other hand, from the Greek “episteme” for knowledge, holds that uncertainty is a reflection of imperfect knowledge, and is reflected in “degree of belief” probability statements. This uncertainty can exist about any proposition, like the chances of a defendant being guilty, the chance the US will go to war, or, as in the article by Bittl, whether the results of RCTs conducted 30 years ago still apply today.

As most clearly articulated by von Mises in 1928, frequentist philosophy firmly rejects such uncertainty as being representable with probabilities or indeed, as being within the realm of science. So it is this definition of probability that we must grapple with moreso than the mechanics of Bayesianism; is it scientifically legitimate to put numbers on qualitative judgments like the reliability of studies from long ago, or the comparability of studies to be pooled, the plausibility of the underlying mechanisms, or the relative reliability of RCTs versus observational studies, to conclude that percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) is better than medical therapy and comparable to coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) in selected patients?

It is easy to answer “no” to that question if one didn’t have to make decisions. But patients with unprotected left main coronary artery disease (ULMCAD) must decide, together with their physicians, whether to undergo PCI or CABG. Any decision will imply a specific quantitative weighting of the evidence, or at least range of weights, even if those weights are not explicitly assigned \textit{a priori}. So one cannot escape such weighting; it is either tacit, implied by the decision, or chosen \textit{a priori} to reflect reasonable judgments, with the decision then following. The latter is what Bittl et al. do in their Bayesian meta-analysis of the evidence supporting the relative benefits of treatments for ULMCAD.

While the notion of epistemic probability might seem far afield from practice guidelines,
in fact such guidelines have their own language of epistemic uncertainty. Instead of stating that
the proposition that PCI is comparable to CABG, has, say, an 80% chance of being true, the
Level of Evidence (LOE) for this statement is classified as “B.” The reason such LOE schemes
have evolved is in part because traditional analyses have no measure nor language for the
probability that a claim is true, even though P-values are occasionally misinterpreted to mean
this10. So a body of evidence rated on the degree of potential bias in the supporting studies is put
into LOE categories “A”, “B” or “C.” Using letters and not numbers for such distinctions is
reflective of an analytic method that does not allow probabilities to be used for this purpose.

The analysis of Bittl et al. differed from the standard one that motivated it in three ways.
First was the use of Bayesian technology, next was the dimension of “cross design synthesis”,
and finally was the network analysis. We will discuss them in that order. There have now been
fairly substantive expositions in the clinical literature of what Bayesian approaches do. Bayesian
analyses have at least two components that differ from frequentist approaches; a prior probability
distribution reflecting the plausible ranges of the true effect based on external evidence, and a
different calculus for how the variability in the summary estimate is calculated. This prior
distribution is often chosen in a way that allows the data to “speak for itself,” a so-called
“uninformative” or “diffuse” prior, which was used here. When there is little variation between
studies, there is typically little difference between the standard random effects model and a
Bayesian summary. That is seen here, with the frequentist 95% confidence interval for the
relative risk of 0.72 to 1.40 for 1-year CABG vs. PCI mortality comparisons, and the Bayesian
credible interval of 0.67 to 1.43, with main effect estimates near 1. In general, the variability of a
Bayesian meta-analytic estimate will be wider than with a frequentist analysis, and more
accurately measure an estimate’s true uncertainty. In this example, if we look solely at the
numbers provided, the Bayesian approach appears to yield little different than the standard method.

The “cross-design synthesis” is next. While the name sounds technical, it really is nothing more than pooling the results of studies with different designs, as is done here with the RCTs and two kinds of cohort studies. If the studies are estimating exactly the same quantity (e.g. a relative risk), there is in theory nothing wrong with this. But studies of different design typically have different susceptibility to biases, with consequently differing confidence in the accuracy of their results. How do we reflect that differing confidence? One way is to use meta-regression to examine how the study estimates vary as a function of design features, although there are typically too few studies for this to tell us enough. However this is done, the net effect is to downweight studies that we believe are more prone to bias. In the absence of adequate empirical data, we can simply choose weights that reflect informally what we believe to be the relative credibility of a given design to the most rigorous design in the synthesis, typically an RCT. The paper describes this approach, but not in enough detail to reproduce i.e. with the quantitative details of the models. There is also not enough qualitative detail about the underlying studies to independently assess their bias potential, although some of that information is in the original ACC guideline document\textsuperscript{11}. Given that the effects of RCTs, cohort and matched cohort studies were statistically similar, the result in this example could not have been sensitive to these weights, but the details could still be useful to inform future analyses.

Finally we come to the network meta-analysis, only in this case there was not much of a network, with only two pairs of comparisons. With strong consistent evidence that CABG is equivalent to PCI (for mortality), and strong consistent evidence that CABG is better than medical therapy, it does not take a sophisticated analysis to confirm the conclusion that PCI is
likely better than medical therapy, although the exact effect estimates and their variability will not be as apparent. The main complication was that almost all of the CABG vs. medical therapy studies were decades in the past, and both therapies have improved over time. The authors deal with this in a variety of reasonable ways, allowing different variation of medical therapy versus CABG outcomes, because medical therapy has probably improved more over time, and reducing the weight of the older studies by a factor of three, which they varied in sensitivity analyses.

It is here in particular that it would have been nice to have seen the authors take more advantage of the Bayesian technology and measures. Stopping with effect estimates and credible intervals essentially shackles their Bayesian analysis with some of the same limitations of a frequentist report. It would have been very interesting to have calculated the probability of equivalence (within defined limits) between CABG and PCI, of the difference between PCI and medical therapy, and perhaps Bayes factors for such quantities\textsuperscript{4,12}. Having implemented approaches to downweight for study age and risk of bias, it would have been quite interesting to see how these affected estimates of the probability of effectiveness. Diamond and Kaul have outlined an alternative approach that would replace LOE designations with a completely Bayesian calculus that classifies conclusions instead into the categories used in legal settings, viz, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “clear and convincing” evidence, etc\textsuperscript{13}. While their specific approach raised other issues\textsuperscript{14}, it shows how the probabilistic conclusions of a Bayesian analysis can link with the levels of evidence used in clinical guideline development. That final step would have been welcome here, highlighting what Bayesian approaches have to offer in support of guidelines that simply cannot be matched by frequentist summaries.

Another advantage of Bayesian analyses for guideline development is transparency. Diamond and many others have decried the sometimes hidden judgments that underlie
guidelines, particularly those not driven by the highest level RCT evidence. Bayesian approaches, which force the quantification of these judgments and models their consequences, can make evidential assessment behind guidelines more transparent and reproducible, allowing us to explicate and perhaps narrow areas of disagreement. Although these authors have done this kind of modeling, the details and sensitivity analyses are not presented in enough detail to reproduce them.

Settings in which one would expect to see bigger differences between Bayesian and frequentist approaches in the numerical estimates would be those in which there was some prior information, substantive quantitative and qualitative variability among studies, and a richer web of treatment comparisons upon which to derive indirect inferences. Less obvious, but no less important, is the value of such models for modeling the effects of different qualitative judgments, and to allow guideline panels to navigate more adeptly in the world of intermediate certainty. This analysis by Bittl et al.3 hopefully can serve as a starting point for future Bayesian evidence analyses, whose value may be more apparent when the outcomes of the summaries are less predictable, qualitative disagreements among experts about the evidence are more difficult to reconcile, and the full range of Bayesian measures is used.

Conflict of Interest Disclosures: None.

References:


Bayesian Methods for Evidence Evaluation: Are We There Yet?
Steven N. Goodman

Circulation. published online May 14, 2013;
Circulation is published by the American Heart Association, 7272 Greenville Avenue, Dallas, TX 75231
Copyright © 2013 American Heart Association, Inc. All rights reserved.
Print ISSN: 0009-7322. Online ISSN: 1524-4539

The online version of this article, along with updated information and services, is located on the
World Wide Web at:
http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/early/2013/05/14/CIRCULATIONAHA.113.003193

Permissions: Requests for permissions to reproduce figures, tables, or portions of articles originally published in
Circulation can be obtained via RightsLink, a service of the Copyright Clearance Center, not the Editorial Office.
Once the online version of the published article for which permission is being requested is located, click Request
Permissions in the middle column of the Web page under Services. Further information about this process is
available in the Permissions and Rights Question and Answer document.

Reprints: Information about reprints can be found online at:
http://www.lww.com/reprints

Subscriptions: Information about subscribing to Circulation is online at:
http://circ.ahajournals.org/subscriptions/